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Goons - One Ocon, a retail dealer, sold a can of spinach to plaintiff's wife,
who, because of something deleterious about the spinach, became ill from
eating it. Plaintiff sued for· damages resulting from his wife's illness. The
court of appeals certified to the supreme court the following question:-"Was
Ocon, the retail dealer, liable to Josey for selling his wife a can of unwholesome
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spinach, plainly labeled with the processor's name and address, upon the theory
that he (Ocon) impliedly warranted that such spinach was fit for human consumption?" Without complicating the problem by an issue of the plaintiff's
rights as distinct from those of the wife herself, the supreme court answered
the question of warranty in the affirmative. Griggs Canning Co. v. Josey,
139 Tex. 623, 164 S.W. (2d) 835 (1942).
In making its decision the court gave full recognition to the fact that precedents are in flat conflict concerning the matter. Superficially, the decision is
merely one more added to the growing weight of opinion that th~ retail dealer
ought to be held liable for some reason, despite the fact that he is utterly without
fault, has made no untrue representations concerning the goods and is in no way
more responsible for the buyer's injury than is the buyer himself. Unfortunately
the Texas court, like its predecessors, calls the liability one for "breach of warranty." Originally and still conventionally that liability of a seller of goods which
is commonly described as liability for "breach of warranty" is a liability predicated
upon some inaccurate representation of fact by the seller. The particular nature
of the liability-as one sounding in tort, or in contract, as one based upon fault,
or upon assumption-is hopelessly confused by looseness of thought and confounded by slovenliness of verbiage. Sometimes in judicial utterance or the
statements of a commentator a "warranty" is characterized as a representation
of the character or quality of the thing sold; sometimes "warranty" is defined
in terms of a "promise"; occasionally, some writer falls into the grievous lexicological error of calling it a "promise" that some fact exists. But whether the
term "warranty" is used to connote a representation itself, or a promise to make
good in damages if a representation be not true, whether the liability is founded
in tort because of the falsity of the representation, or in contract because of an
assumed promise to make good if the chattel sold should prove not as represented,
somewhere in the background of the liability, the courts, until recently, have
consistently looked for some actual representation by the seller concerning the
goods. The representation might be express, or it might be implied by the mere
fact of sale under the particular circumstances; and an "intention to be bound"
by the representation has not always been thought necessary. But courts, until
relatively recently, have consistently declined to infer a representation by implication unless such an implication was in truth fairly and reasonably inferrable
from the circumstances.1
In the principal case and those similar ones which precede it, there is no
pretense of any express representation by the seller as to the contents of the can.
Neither can it fairly and reasonably be inferred that the seller has by implication said anything more than that he got the can from a reputable packing
company and that so far as he knows its contents are what they purport to be.
In actuality, there is no representation, express or implied, by the retail seller
that the content of the can is in truth wholesome, and there is no promise, express or fairly inferrable, that he will make good in damages if the content
1 This statement is elaborated and, the writer believes, verified in Waite, "Retail
Responsibility and Judicial Law-making," 34 MICH. L. REv. 494 (1936). See also
as to the historical significance of the term "warranty," Prosser, "The Implied Warranty of Merchantable Quality," 27 MINN. L. REv. 117 (1943).
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proves to be harmful. By no stretch of logical reasoning, therefore, can the
retailer be held liable for breach of "warranty," in the original and usually
accepted connotation of that term.
As a matter of public policy, it is conceivable that the burden of loss ought
to be transferrable, even in such a situation, from the consumer to the shoulders
of the equally innocent retailer. 2 This is the position that courts have taken in
growing numbers, at least where the retailer is a seller of food, since Ward v.
Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. 3 and the Texas court has added itself to
the number. But this recent decision is at least frank; after setting forth its
reasons for believing in the wisdom of the policy,4 the court says explicitly: "We
hold that a retailer who sells unwholesome food for human consumption is liable
to the consumer for the consequences under an implied warrant imposed by law

as a matter of public policy." 5
Thus a "warranty" has become no longer a representation, express or
fairly implied, out. of which springs a legal liability; it now signifies also a
liability created by judicial declaration in any case of sale, when the judicial idea
of public policy makes such a liability seem wise. But even one who approves
of judicial legislation as a proper method of conforming law to social necessity
might well be critical ·of its concealment behind the four-term fallacy of logic.

J.B. W.

2 That there is no sound policy justifying the liability, because the injured consumer is already amply protected by rights of action against the packer of the goods,
is argued at length in Waite, "Retail Responsibility and Judicial Law-making," 34
MICH L. REv. 494 (1936). A contrary opinion is expressed in Brown, "The Liability of Retail Dealers for Defective Food Products," 23 MINN. L. REV. 585 (1939);
Llewellyn, "On Warranty of Quality, and Society," 36 CoL. L. REv. 699 (1936).
See also on the subject in general, Eldredge, "Vendor's Tort Liability," 89 UNiv. PA.
L. REV. 306 ( l 941) ; Leidy, "Tort Liability of Suppliers of Defective Chattels," 40
MICH. L. REV. 679 '(1942).
3 231 Mass. 90, 120 N.E. 225 (1918).
4 Reasons, however, which seem as cogently to apply to a sale of any goods;
leaving unexplained their judicial acceptance, generally speaking, only in food cases
and their equivalents. Justice Critz, dissenting, says sapiently, 164 S.W. (2d) at 842:
"As applied to the sale of food put up in scealed containers, with the name of the
manufacturer or processor indicated thereon, no practical benefit to the public health
can be obtained by holding the retailer liable as an implied warrantor. . .• no rule of
convenience can ever justify mulcting one in damages who has done no wrong."
(Italics added.)
5 164 S.W. (2d) at 840. (Present writer's italics.)

